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1 
Abstract Innovation, Virtual Ideas, 
and Artificial Legal Thought 
ANDREW C. MICHAELS* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Silicon Valley culture of tech-triumphalism,1 it is often 
assumed that advances in technology are necessarily 
“making the world a better place,” 2  though in reality 
technology can have both positive and negative effects. 3 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.  The
author thanks the Maryland Journal of Business & Technology Law for
its excellent Spring 2018 symposium on “Virtual Legality,” out of which
this article in part developed, and the editors of this journal for their
judicious editing and publishing work.  The author also thanks Paul
Janicke and those who participated in the 2018 Mid-Atlantic Junior
Faculty at the University of Richmond School of Law, the same year’s
Patcon 8 conference at the University of San Diego School of Law, the
2018 IP Scholars Conference at UC Berkeley School of Law, and the 2018
IP Scholars Roundtable at Texas A&M University School of Law.
1  See SHANNON VALLOR, TECHNOLOGY AND THE VIRTUES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL GUIDE TO A FUTURE WORTH WANTING 126 (2016) (“we can
no longer afford the modern illusion that our technosocial innovations are
conductive to human mastery”); see also KENTARO TOYAMA, GEEK HERESY:
RESCUING SOCIAL CHANGE FROM THE CULT OF TECHNOLOGY x (2015)
(“World leaders are convinced that technology will make the world a
better place.  But does technology really cause positive social change?”).
2 See, e.g., Andrew Marantz, How Silicon Valley Nails Silicon Valley, THE
NEW YORKER (June 9, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-
desk/how-silicon-valley-nails-silicon-valley); Dov Greenbaum, Making
Law School A Better Place: Using HBO’s Silicon Valley to Teach
Intellectual Property Law & Entrepreneurship, 57 IDEA 183, 202-03
(2017) (“The mantra ‘making the world a better place,’ inexplicably
attached to every software development, no matter the level of
esotericism.”).
3 See, e.g., Jacob Weisberg, The Digital Poorhouse, Vol. LXV No. 11 THE
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 45 (June 7, 2018) (“Automated decision-
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Mobile technology, for example, does have its advantages but 
it also enables employers to “demand that employees are 
available at all hours of the day,” and “an increasing number 
of individuals face the health risks associated with over work 
and burn out.”4  
Of course there have long been some skeptics;5 over 
three decades ago an astute observer noted: “No one objects 
when a retail transaction takes three times longer than it did 
ten years ago because now it’s enacted on a computerized 
cash register.”6  These days, some people are being paid to 
assist or act like robots, 7  and the occasional machine 
malfunction may be the only thing preserving their jobs.8  
Technology may even be changing the way we think, and not 
making has revolutionized many sectors of the economy and it brings real 
gains to society.  It also threatens privacy, autonomy, democratic practice, 
and the ideals of social equality in ways we are only beginning to 
appreciate.”); E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF 
PEOPLE MATTERED 157 (1973) (“The amount of real leisure a society 
enjoys tends to be in inverse proportion to the amount of labour-saving 
machinery it employs.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
4 Paul M. Secunda, The Employee Right to Disconnect, MARQUETTE L. 
SCH. LEGAL STUD. PAPER NO. 18-02, 19 (Feb. 1, 2018), https://ssrn. 
com/abstract=3116158. 
5  See, e.g., JIMMY BUFFETT, Everybody’s On The Phone, on TAKE THE 
WEATHER WITH YOU (RCA Records, 2006) (“Everybody’s on the phone; So 
connected and all alone; From the pizza boy to the socialite; We all salute 
the satellites.”). 
6  PAUL FUSSELL, CLASS: A GUIDE THROUGH THE AMERICAN STATUS 
SYSTEM 176 (1983).  
7 Cf. Olivia Solon, The Rise of ‘Pseudo-AI’: How Tech Firms Quietly Use 
Humans to do Bots’ Work, THE GUARDIAN (July 6, 2018, 3:01 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/06/artificial-
intelligence-ai-humans-bots-tech-companies (“it’s cheaper and easier to 
get humans to behave like robots than it is to get machines to behave like 
humans”). 
8 See generally Camilla A. Hrdy, Intellectual Property and the End of 
Work (Aug. 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3011735. 
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necessarily for the better.9  The effects on our minds of “a 
world in which we’re constantly watched and always 
distracted,” are not currently fully understood, but it would 
be naïve to think that such effects are entirely positive or do 
not exist.10  Technology itself is neither inherently good nor 
evil; it is a neutral force and its effects depend on how it is 
employed.11  Shawn Bayern puts it well: “The problem isn’t 
technology; it’s what we’re doing with it.”12  
This article will explore how technology could change 
the way we think (or don’t think) about law, and whether 
such changes would be beneficial.  Part I will use the novel 
Ready Player One to consider how virtual reality technology 
might distract people from reality. Considering a 
hypothetical patent on a virtual reality idea from the novel, 
Part II will discuss the evolving law of patentable subject 
matter and abstract ideas.  Part III will consider predictions 
that legal thought of the type done in the previous part will 
become automated and then will consider some potential 
drawbacks of replacing human legal thought with artificial 
legal thought.  This article will then briefly conclude by 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Robert Darnton, The Greatest Show on Earth, LXV 11 THE NEW 
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 68, 72 (June 28, 2018) (“According to McIntyre, 
the change that did the most to create the current post-truth environment 
is the rise of social media.”) (reviewing LEE MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH 
(2018)).  
10 FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF 
BIG TECH 8 (2017); see generally NICHOLAS G. CARR, THE SHALLOWS: 
WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS (2010). 
11 See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY 33 
(1977) (“The essence of technology is in a lofty sense ambiguous.”); 
ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL 295 (1956) (“The machine is bad only in the 
way that it is now employed.  Its benefits must be accepted even if its 
ravages are rejected.”). 
12 Shawn Bayern, Why I Don’t Blog, HUFFPOST (June 20, 2010, 5:12 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/shawn-bayern/why-i-dont-blog-yes-i-
rec_b_542127.html. 
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questioning whether anyone will be thinking about the law 
in the future, and whether it matters. 
 
I. VIRTUAL LAW  
 
In his sci-fi novel Ready Player One,13 Ernest Cline imagines 
the promises and perils of virtual reality technology.  The 
novel is set in a mid-twenty-first century future where the 
physical world has deteriorated to the point that most people 
live primarily in a virtual environment known as OASIS.14  
The OASIS was created by an eccentric genius character,15 
and one positive aspect of the OASIS virtual reality is that it 
seems to have a beneficial and democratizing effect on the 
education system.16  Books, movies, and music, all seem to be 
easily and freely accessible, at least so long as the materials 
are more than forty years old.17 
One can imagine, though, that if a less benevolent 
organization or figure were to gain control, the system could 
                                                 
13 ERNEST CLINE, READY PLAYER ONE (2011). 
14 See id. at 58-60 (“As the era of cheap, abundant energy drew to a close, 
poverty and unrest began to spread like a virus.  Every day, more and 
more people had reason to seek solace inside Halliday and Morrow’s 
virtual utopia.”). 
15 See id. at 55-56 (“Despite his eccentricities, no one ever questioned 
Halliday’s genius.”).  The eccentric genius, James Halliday, “suffered 
from Asperger’s syndrome, or from some other form of high-functioning 
autism,” and created Gregarious Games, which later became Gregarious 
Simulation Systems [GSS] along with his childhood friend, Ogden 
Morrow.  Id. at 54-56. 
16 See id. at 47 (“All of my teachers were pretty great.  Unlike their real-
world counterparts, most of the OASIS public school teachers seemed to 
genuinely enjoy their job, probably because they didn’t have to spend half 
their time acting as babysitters and disciplinarians.”). 
17 Id. at 62 (“The Almanac contained thousands of references to Halliday’s 
favorite books, TV shows, movies, songs, graphic novels, and videogames.  
Most of these items were over forty years old, and so free digital copies of 
them could be downloaded from the OASIS.”). 
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instead easily be used as a tool for mind control and 
propaganda.  Indeed in the novel, the genius creator has 
recently passed away, and the protagonists are attempting to 
prevent the OASIS from falling into the hands of a “fascist 
multinational conglomerate.”18   
While the OASIS provides an escape from the bleak 
physical world, it may also contribute to the decay of that 
world by providing a distraction.19  The main protagonist 
doesn’t bother voting for U.S. government officials, reasoning 
that it “didn’t matter who was in charge,” because those 
“people were rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic and 
everyone knew it,” but he does vote in the OASIS User 
Council elections.20  With this lack of attention, the laws of 
the United States in the novel have apparently devolved to 
the point where large corporations can force a citizen with 
unpaid debts into “indenturement” via a “corporate arrest.”21 
The virtual world of the OASIS is divided into different 
sectors, and to some extent the “rules of the game” differ 
                                                 
18 Id. at 118.  See also id. at 33 (“I was horrified at the thought of IOI 
[Innovative Online Industries, the world’s largest Internet service 
provider] taking control of the OASIS. . . . User anonymity and free speech 
would become things of the past.”); id. at 28 (“Back when Halliday was 
still running the company, GSS had won the right to keep every OASIS 
user’s identity private in a landmark Supreme Court ruling.”). 
19 ERNEST CLINE, READY PLAYER ONE 120 (2011) (Ogden Morrow left the 
company he co-founded, GSS, because he felt that OASIS had “become a 
self-imposed prison for humanity,” that is, a “pleasant place for the world 
to hide from its problems while human civilization slowly collapses, 
primarily due to neglect.”). 
20 See id. at 201 (“I did take the time to vote in the OASIS elections, 
however, because their outcomes actually affected me. . . .  I voted to 
reelect . . . those two geezers [who] had been doing a kick-ass job of 
protecting user rights for over a decade.”). 
21 Id. at 270-73 (“These men were IOI [corporate] credit officers with a 
valid indenturement arrest warrant.”). 
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depending on which zone the user is in.22  These rules (or 
virtual laws)23 are mostly hard-coded into the virtual reality; 
certain areas, for example, are “no player-versus-player 
combat” zones, where any attempt to harm another person 
(or “player”) will simply be ineffectual. 24   This automatic 
enforcement is an interesting aspect of “law” in virtual 
reality, and obviously a major difference from most of our 
current reality, where laws must be enforced through other 
mechanisms.  In such a future, virtual (or even real) patents 
might automatically issue upon an invention in virtual 
reality, and patent infringement in virtual reality could 
perhaps automatically be disallowed.25 
There is at least one minor reference to patent law in 
Ready Player One.  Before he died, James Halliday, the 
eccentric genius creator of OASIS, programmed into the 
virtual world an elaborate contest, the winner of which would 
gain control of his company and effective control of the virtual 
                                                 
22  Id. at 49-50 (“Each zone had a unique combination of rules and 
parameters. Magic would function in some zones and not in others.  The 
same was true of technology.”).  
23 Cf. Gilad Yadin, Virtual Reality Exceptionalism, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 839, 841 (2018) (“In Wonderland, the rules of the real world do 
not apply; Alice moves between areas governed by anarchy, mock 
etiquette, and absurdist absolute sovereignty.”) (citing Mary Liston, The 
Rule of Law Through the Looking Glass, 21 LAW & LITERATURE 42, 46 
(2009)). 
24 CLINE, supra note 13, at 50 (“If you flew your technology-based starship 
into a zone where technology didn’t function, your engines would fail the 
moment you crossed the zone border. . . . There were pacifist zones where 
no player-versus-player combat was allowed, and player-versus-player 
zones where it was every avatar for themselves.”). 
25 Cf. Richard M. Re, Imagining Perfect Surveillance, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
DISC. 264 (2016); see also Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not 
Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3135549 (“[A]n unappealable fine imposed by a red light 
camera, and automatically deducted from a motorist’s bank account, 
would amount to pure automation of law[.]”).  
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OASIS. 26   One minor “level” in this contest involves the 
contestant stepping into the role of a movie character, and 
having to correctly say the lines and act in the role of that 
character in order to move on.27   Apparently no one had 
thought of designing a game like this before, but it turned out 
to be very popular, and upon realizing what Halliday had 
done, his company “patented the idea,” and began creating 
such interactive games for many different movies, calling the 
games Flicksyncs.28   
At first glance, the patenting of this entire class of 
games seems to run afoul of the adage that “one may not 
patent an idea,”29 that is, the patent eligibility prohibition on 
“abstract ideas.”30  On the other hand, as explained below, to 
the extent that new technology was required to implement 
the idea, that technology would potentially be patent eligible.  
The next part will consider the patentability of this fictional 
class of games as a thought experiment for teasing out some 
incoherence in the contemporary doctrine of patent eligible 
subject matter.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 CLINE, supra note 13,  at 1–4. 
27 See id. at 108–12. 
28 Id. at 112 (“When GSS got wind of the WarGames simulation inside the 
First Gate (and they did a short time later), the company quickly patented 
the idea and began to buy up the rights to old movies and TV shows and 
convert them into immersive interactive games that they dubbed 
Flicksyncs.”). 
29 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).  See also In re Comiskey, 
554 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court has held that 
‘[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.’”) (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. 
Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874)). 
30 See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 977 (“‘Abstract ideas’ are one type 
of subject matter that the Supreme Court has consistently held fall 
beyond the broad reaches of patentable subject matter under § 101.”).  
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II. PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 
 
A. Abstraction and Innovation 
 
The Patent Act defines patent eligible subject matter in § 
101: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.”31  This language is fairly broad and inclusive, 
which is reasonable given that it defines only eligibility, not 
patentability. 32   If something is not patent eligible, it of 
course cannot be patentable.  But if it is eligible, that doesn’t 
necessarily make it patentable.33  In order to be patentable, 
the invention must also meet the statute’s other 
requirements, such as novelty (§ 102), nonobviousness (§ 
103), and enablement (§ 112).34  
Some inventions or discoveries that are novel, 
nonobvious, and enabled are nevertheless not patentable 
because they claim subject matter that is not even eligible for 
a patent under § 101. 35  In order to avoid conflating 
                                                 
31 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
32 Cf. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1370 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(Moore, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) 
(“the single sentence in § 101 actually contains two patentability 
requirements: eligibility and utility.”). 
33 See Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“a patent that presents a process sufficient to pass the 
coarse eligibility filter may nonetheless be invalid as indefinite because 
the invention would ‘not provide sufficient particularity and clarity to 
inform skilled artisans of the bounds of the claim.’” (quoting Star Sci., Inc. 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008))). 
34 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (2012).  
35 See, e.g., Maxus Strategic Sys. v. Aqumin LLC, No. A-11-CV-073-LY, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152032, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2015) (“If a claim 
is not drawn to patent-eligible subject matter, it ‘must be rejected even if 
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patentability with eligibility, it has been urged that courts 
should consider eligibility after patentability,36 but perhaps 
unfortunately, the recent law has not tended to go in this 
direction.37  The recognized categories of non-eligible subject 
matter are: (1) laws of nature; (2) natural phenomena; and 
(3) abstract ideas.38 
What I would like to suggest here is that the third 
category of non-eligible subject matter, abstract ideas, is 
different from the first two in that it does not invoke “nature” 
or the “natural,” and that this is an important and under-
recognized difference.39  Something that is natural, though it 
might be discovered by humans, is almost by definition not 
                                                 
it meets all the other legal requirements of patentability.’” (quoting In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008))). 
36 See, e.g., MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (“Rather than taking the path the dissent urges, courts could 
avoid the swamp of verbiage that is § 101 by exercising their inherent 
power to control the processes of litigation, and insist that litigants 
initially address patent invalidity issues in terms of the conditions of 
patentability defenses as the statute provides, specifically §§ 102, 103, 
and 112.”) (internal citation omitted); BASCOM Glob. Internet Services, 
Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Newman, J., concurring) (“There is no good reason why the district court 
should be constrained from determining patentability, instead of 
eligibility based on ‘abstract idea,’ when the patentability/validity 
determination would be dispositive of the dispute.”). 
37 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Procedure of Patent Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 21), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3161621 (“[A] 
surprising amount of case law states that courts must decide patent 
eligibility before analyzing other issues [.]”). 
38 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) 
(“We have long held that this provision contains an important implicit 
exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 
patentable.” (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013))).  
39 See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., No. 2016-2502, 896 F.3d 1335, 
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Plager, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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created or invented by humans40 (at least not in the colloquial 
sense of the word “invention”).41  By contrast, abstract ideas 
are at least arguably products of human thought or 
imagination, so an abstract idea can potentially be 
inventive.42  But due to the Court’s view of § 101, even a truly 
inventive pure abstract idea is not patent eligible subject 
matter.43   
                                                 
40  Natural, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ 
natural (last visited Sept. 24, 2018); Artificial, DICTIONARY.COM,  
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/artificial (last visited Sept. 24, 
2018); cf. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 
(1948) (“[I]t certainly was not the product of invention. There is no way 
in which we could call it such unless we borrowed invention from the 
discovery of the natural principle itself.”). 
41 But cf. 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (“The term ‘invention’ means invention or 
discovery.”); PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT 
JUDICIAL GUIDE 14-31 (3d. ed. 2016) (“The fact that § 101 of the Patent 
Act confers patent eligibility on ‘[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof . . .’ however, only adds to the 
confusion.”). 
42 See, e.g., Derek Abbott, The Reasonable Ineffectiveness of Mathematics, 
101 Proc. IEEE No. 10, 2147, 2153 (2013) (“Mathematics is a human 
invention for describing patterns and regularities.”). But see CLS Bank 
Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, 
J., concurring) (“[A] person cannot truly ‘invent’ an abstract idea or 
scientific truth.  He or she can discover it, but not invent it.”). This article 
agrees with Judge Lourie that one cannot “invent” a scientific truth, but 
takes the position (contrary to his) that one can at least arguably invent 
an abstract idea. See discussion supra Part II.A; see also Frederick 
Schauer, Law as a Malleable Artifact, Oxford Univ. Press (forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3183928 (“[T]he very ideas (or concepts, if you will) of chairs, 
of art, and of music are human creations, and are consequently unlike 
gold, water, and elephants . . . .”). 
43 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 
2107, 2117 (2013) (“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant 
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); Berkheimer v. HP, 
Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Lourie, J., concurring in the 
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“[M]any brilliant and 
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This is all to say while “nature” and “natural” at least 
pull in the other direction from “inventive,” the same is not 
true of “abstract.”  The opposite of abstract is concrete, 44 
whereas the opposite of natural is artificial, i.e., made by 
humans. 45  A thing cannot be both natural and invented 
(though it could be discovered), but an idea can be both 
abstract and invented by humans; 46  abstractness and 
inventiveness are separate and essentially unrelated 
concepts.47     
A pure algorithm for example, even if inventive or 
“newly discovered,” is an abstract idea ineligible for patent 
protection.48  The idea for blockchain technology described in 
                                                 
unconventional ideas must be beyond patenting simply because they are 
‘only’ ideas, which cannot be monopolized.”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor 
Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new 
abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”). 
44  Abstract, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ 
abstract (defining “abstract” as “thought of apart from concrete realities, 
specific objects, or actual instances”) (last visited September 24, 2018). 
45 See Artificial and Natural, supra note 40.  
46 Whether machines could invent an idea is an interesting question.  See 
generally Liza Vertinsky, Thinking Machines and Patent Law, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (forthcoming 2018), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036030. 
47 Cf. Affinity Labs of Tex. v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (the patentee asserted that its idea was “novel as of the priority 
of the patent,” but the court found that even “assuming that is true, it 
does not avoid the problem of abstractness”); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. 
Comcast Cable Commc’ns., LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(“Eligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.”). 
48 See, e.g., Market Track, LLC v. Efficient Collaborative Retail Mktg., 
LLC, No. 14-C-4957, 2015 WL 3637740, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2015) 
(“[M]erely implementing the arithmetic steps in a newly discovered 
mathematical algorithm . . . did not add enough . . . to transform that 
algorithm—an abstract idea—into patentable subject matter[.]”) (citing 
Gottschalk v. Benson 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)). 
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the Bitcoin whitepaper was a brilliantly inventive idea, 49 
though it may have been too abstract to be patentable.  Such 
a patent would preempt downstream innovation and “might 
tend to impede innovation” 50  in the blockchain space, 
although more specific implementations of the technology 
could be patentable.51  
Some mathematical equations may describe laws of 
nature, but all pure equations are also ineligible as abstract 
ideas,52 though a specific application of an equation could be 
patent eligible. 53   Einstein’s E=mc2, for example, is an 
                                                 
49  See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER 
ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2009), available at https://bitcoin.org/ 
bitcoin.pdf. 
50 See Mayo Collaborative Servs v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 
71 (2012) (“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent 
might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”); 
see also id. at 85 (“In Bilski the Court pointed out that to allow ‘petitioners 
to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields.’”) 
(quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010)). 
51  See Gurneet Singh, Are Internet-Implemented Applications of 
Blockchain Technology Patent-Eligible in the United States, 17 CHI. KENT 
J. INTELL. PROP. 356, 376 (2018) (“federal U.S. law allows a patent to be 
granted for many, but not all, aspects of internet-implemented 
applications of blockchain technology.”);  see also Ira Schaefer and Ted 
Mylnar, Is a Blockchain Patent Still Possible? COINDESK (Nov. 15, 2016, 
10:05 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-patent-still-possible/ 
(“[I]mprovements in blockchain data structures, in solving proof of work 
problems, and in encryption and hashing functions have the potential to 
be patent-eligible subject matter.”). 
52 See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Mathematical formulas are a type of abstract idea.”); 
Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (“A mathematical formula may describe a law of nature, 
a scientific truth, or an abstract idea.”); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 
250 F. 3d 705, 711 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (“Mathematical calculations and 
formulas are abstract ideas.”). 
53 See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) 
(“This is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be 
characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to 
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abstract equation which at least in theory describes a law of 
nature. 54   Einstein did not invent the law of nature, he 
discovered it (to the extent that the theory is correct), but he 
did arguably invent the abstract idea of the equation, as he 
developed an abstract theory of physics and worked out the 
mathematical description.55   
This was a major accomplishment, and a major 
breakthrough for science, but such pure abstract ideas are 
nevertheless not patent eligible subject matter.  One reason 
is that mathematical equations are elemental building blocks 
of scientific and technological work.56  Another reason is that 
abstract ideas are essentially thoughts, and patents should 
not be capable of monopolizing thoughts. 57  Constraining 
                                                 
produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”); Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d 
at 1058-59 (holding patentable a method for analyzing electrocardiograph 
signals that used “electronic equipment programmed to perform 
mathematical computation.”). 
54 See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 78 (“Einstein, we assume, 
could not have patented his famous law by claiming a process consisting 
of simply telling linear accelerator operators to refer to the law to 
determine how much energy an amount of mass has produced (or vice 
versa).”). 
55 See generally DAVID BODANIS, E=MC2: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE WORLD’S 
MOST FAMOUS EQUATION (Bloomsbury Publishing 2009). 
56 See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 71 (‘“Phenomena of nature, 
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual 
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.”’ (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 
(1972))); id. at 89 (“[T]he cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition 
against patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the like, 
which serves as a somewhat more easily administered proxy for the 
underlying ‘building-block’ concern”); PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT 
CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 14-31 (3d ed. 2016) (“[L]aws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are basic building blocks 
of human ingenuity.”). 
57  See Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) 
(“No one should be inhibited from thinking by a patent. . . .  Moreover 
such a patent would be unenforceable.  Who knows what people are 
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thought would seem to be counterproductive to the patent 
system’s goal of promoting innovation, whereas a society 
where free thought is encouraged would likely tend to be 
more innovative.58  Indeed, patentable innovation requires 
thought that would not have been obvious to others.59   
So even inventive abstract ideas are not patent 
eligible. But to avoid confusion, it is important to recognize 
that abstractness and innovativeness are separate concepts; 
that abstract ideas can be inventive, even if they are 
nevertheless not patent eligible. The doctrine has often failed 
to articulate this idea; indeed in Alice itself the Court states: 
“[W]e must examine the elements of the claim to determine 
whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to 
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible 
application.”60  Taking this cue from Alice, courts often look 
for “additional claim elements that introduce an inventive 
concept to the claim.”61  Such language seems to ignore the 
possibility that the abstract idea itself could have been an 
inventive concept.  What the courts should be looking for is 
not just any inventive concept, but a non-abstract inventive 
                                                 
thinking?”) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson 
(Aug. 13, 1813) (“[I]f nature has made any one thing less susceptible, than 
all others, of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power 
called an Idea.”)). 
58 Cf. Bertrand Russell, The Role of Individuality, in AUTHORITY AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL 37 (1949) (“[A] community needs, if it is to prosper, a certain 
number of individuals who do not wholly conform to the general type.  
Practically all progress, artistic, moral, and intellectual, as depended 
upon such individuals . . . .”).   
59 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
60 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014) 
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 
66 at 72-73 (2012)). 
61 Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Polar Electro Oy, 243 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 
1235-36 (D. Utah 2017) (emphasis added) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355).  
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concept. 62  But courts sometimes find that claims are 
ineligible because “the patent does not reveal anything more 
than a non-inventive abstract idea,” 63  which confusingly 
seems to imply that the claims would be patent eligible if the 
abstract idea were inventive.  With courts often failing to 
recognize that abstractness is a separate concept from 
inventiveness,64 the doctrine has become rather muddled and 
confused.65  That such imprecise use of language has led to 
confusion should be no surprise.66  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,  890 F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (“No matter how much of an advance in the finance field the 
claims recite, the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with 
no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm.  An 
advance of that nature is ineligible for patenting.”). 
63 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. QuantifiCare, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1025 
(N.D. Cal. 2017). 
64 Cf. Jedi Techs., Inc. v. Spark Networks, Inc., No. 1:16-1055-GMS, 2017 
WL 3315279, at *8 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 2017) (“although the ’977 patent 
recites an abstract idea, it should not be found invalid if there is evidence 
of an inventive concept or contribution”).  
65 See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018)  
(Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) 
(“I believe the law needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by 
Congress, to work its way out of what so many in the innovation field 
consider are § 101 problems”); cf. Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming 
Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 647 (“The consensus view is that 
the Court’s eligibility jurisprudence is impenetrable.”); Ryan Davis, Iancu 
Decries ‘Tortured Exercise’ of Patent Eligibility Analysis, LAW360 (June 
12, 2018, 9:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1052844/iancu-
decries-tortured-exercise-of-patent-eligibility-analysis; Robert Stoll, 
Alice Angst Intensifies, LAW360 (March 23, 2018, 1:01 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1025590/alice-angst-intensifies. 
66 See Paul M. Janicke, A Need for Clearer Language about Patent Law, 
11 JOHN MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 457 (2012). 
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B. The Non-Abstract Inventive Concept 
 
Proceeding now down the rabbit hole of Alice’s wondrous two-
part test, the first step is to determine whether the claims 
are “directed to” one of the three categories of patent 
ineligible subject matter: laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
or abstract ideas.67  If not, the claims are patent eligible, 
(that is, they clear the § 101 hurdle, though they may not be 
patentable). 68   But if so, the next step is to look for an 
“inventive concept” that transforms the claims into 
“something more” than the patent ineligible subject matter.69 
Although a number of judges have, for good reason, 
questioned the value of the two-step test, 70  the Federal 
Circuit has reaffirmed that both steps are substantial.71  For 
                                                 
67 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) 
(citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1297 (2012)). 
68  See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Bascom Glob. 
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1354 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., concurring) (“Claims that are imprecise or that 
read on prior art or that are unsupported by description or that are not 
enabled raise questions of patentability, not eligibility.”). 
69 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-55 (2014) 
(citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 
72 (2012)). 
70 See, e.g., Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1352-53 (Newman, J., concurring) (“I 
write separately to urge a more flexible approach to the determination of 
patent eligibility, for the two-step protocol for ascertaining whether a 
patent is for an ‘abstract idea’ is not always necessary to resolve patent 
disputes.”); Iron Gate Sec., Inc. v. Lowe’s Cos., No. 15-cv-8814(KBF), 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101796, at *40 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2016) (“A number 
of courts have aptly observed that it is easier to separate the two steps in 
recitation than in application and that the two steps could arguable be 
collapsed into a single one.”). 
71 See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court’s two-stage inquiry “plainly 
contemplates that the first step of the inquiry is a meaningful one, i.e., 
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example in Enfish, the court found that the claims were not 
directed to an abstract idea, because the “plain focus of the 
claims [was] on an improvement to computer functionality 
itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is 
used in its ordinary capacity.”72  As such, the court did not 
proceed to the more complicated inquiry of step two.73  Step 
one may thus function as an initial filter or first look at the 
claims; if the general focus of the claims is not on ineligible 
subject matter, then it is not necessary to engage the more 
difficult inquiry of whether the additional matter contains an 
inventive concept. 
Step two is where the difference between abstract 
ideas and the first two categories becomes relevant.  Because 
nature (or the natural) cannot be invented by humans,74 an 
inventive concept must necessarily be something other than 
the law of nature or natural phenomena.  By contrast, an 
abstract idea could be an inventive concept, though it is not 
the type of inventive concept that one should be looking for 
at step two of the Alice test.  So the “inventive concept” part 
of the test makes more sense in the context of natural 
phenomena or laws of nature; indeed the two-step test was 
“initially set forth in Mayo in the context of natural laws,” 
but then was extended to abstract ideas in Alice. 75  
Traditionally, the evaluation of inventiveness was more 
appropriate under §§ 102 and 103, but the Court in Alice / 
Mayo has moved the inventiveness inquiry more into § 101.76  
                                                 
that a substantial class of claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible 
concept”). 
72  Id. at 1336 (explaining that the claims “are directed to a specific 
improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the self-
referential table”). 
73 Id. at 1339. 
74 See supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text. 
75 Iron Gate, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101796, at *16–17 n.4. 
76 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 
90 (2012) (“We recognize that, in evaluating the significance of additional 
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The need for a non-abstract inventive concept stems 
from the notion that one cannot transform an abstract idea 
into patentable subject matter simply by adding 
“insignificant post-solution activity,” 77  or by applying the 
abstract idea using routine and conventional technology such 
as a general purpose computer.78  This is true even if the 
                                                 
steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty 
inquiry might sometimes overlap.”); Andrew Schreiber, Go (En)Fish: 
Drawing CAD Files from the Patent Eligibility Pool, 58 IDEA 1, 54 (2017) 
(“[T]he Alice step two inventive concept analysis imports § 102 and § 103 
considerations.”); PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT 
JUDICIAL GUIDE 14-31 (3d ed. 2016) (“As the evolution of these doctrines 
reveals, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on inventive application rests on 
a questionable jurisprudential foundation.”) (citing Jeffrey A. Lefstin, 
Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565 (2015)); see also 
Paxton M. Lewis, Comment, The Conflation of Patent Eligibility and 
Obviousness: Alice’s Substitution of Section 103, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 
ONLAW 13 (2017). 
77 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) 
(“We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of 
intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer 
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible 
invention.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610-11 (2010) 
(explaining that the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot 
be circumvented  by [merely] . . . adding [superfluous] postsolution 
activity.”’) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-192 (1981)); 
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299 (“‘[P]ost-solution activity’ that is purely 
‘conventional or obvious,’ the Court wrote, ‘can[not] transform an 
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.’”) (quoting Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)); see also Laurence Rogers, Mayo Overlap 
Between Sections 101 And 102/103 — Not New, LAW360: EXPERT 
ANALYSIS (July 20, 2012, 1:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/356042/mayo-overlap-between-sections-101-and-102-103-not-
new. 
78 See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 
1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An inventive concept that transforms the 
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention must be significantly more 
than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to 
implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.”) (citing Alice, 134 
S.Ct. at 2358).  
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abstract idea itself is innovative. 79   If the doctrine is to 
maintain some semblance of coherence, what the courts 
should be searching for at step two is an inventive concept 
aside from the abstract idea; a non-abstract inventive 
concept.80 
Courts often do not articulate this clearly, instead 
describing step two as simply a search for an inventive 
concept.81  There is no claim here that abstract ideas are any 
less deserving of exemption under § 101 than the two 
categories of nature, the point here is simply that abstract 
ideas can fairly be thought of as “invented” by humans, 
whereas nature generally cannot, and that courts should be 
more cognizant of this difference.  Particularly so, when 
importing language from a test developed in the context of 
natural phenomena into the context of abstract ideas, if 
confusion is to be avoided. 
                                                 
79 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
80 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82 (explaining that in Flook, “putting the formula 
to the side, there was no ‘inventive concept’ in the claimed application of 
the formula.”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)); Enfish, 
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining 
that “the second step of the Alice inquiry” asks if “there is some inventive 
concept in the application of the abstract idea.”) (emphasis added). 
81 See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In short, the claimed solution amounts to an inventive 
concept for resolving this particular Internet-centric problem, rendering 
the claims patent-eligible.”); IPLearn-Focus, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 
14-cv-00151-JD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90077, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 
2015) (“The second step of this test has been described as a search for an 
inventive concept.”) (internal quotes omitted) (citations omitted); Aatrix 
Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1124 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (stating that the district court below found that the claims were 
“directed to abstract ideas without inventive concepts.”); Pres. Wellness 
Techs. LLC v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, No. 2:15-CV-1559-WCB, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61841, at *20 (E.D. Tex. May 9, 2016) (“Following 
the analytical framework set forth in Alice, the Court addresses the 
questions whether the ’271 claims are drawn to an abstract idea and, if 
so, whether they embody an inventive concept.”). 
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C. Improvement or Application 
 
Back to virtual reality: what if one were to think of a new, 
non-obvious abstract idea, and simply say, “Do it in virtual 
reality.” Would that idea be patent eligible?  We know that 
simply applying an abstract idea on a routine and 
conventional general-purpose computer is not sufficient to 
make the claims patent eligible, 82  but is virtual reality 
technology routine and conventional?  In the future of Ready 
Player One, where many people spend the majority of their 
time in virtual reality,83 the answer would seem to be a clear 
yes.  As such, the novel’s hypothetical patent on Flicksyncs 
would seem to be of questionable validity.  The idea of a video 
game where the player receives points for correctly acting the 
part of a character in a movie is an abstract one, even 
assuming that it is novel and non-obvious as was alleged in 
the book.84  It is perhaps an inventive concept, but that does 
not make the idea any less abstract. 
 Applying this abstract idea using routine and 
conventional virtual reality technology would not be 
sufficient to make it patent eligible. But if some improvement 
to the virtual reality technology itself were required to 
implement the idea, this would likely make it patentable, as 
it could be a sufficient non-abstract “inventive concept,” to 
pass Alice step two.85  Whether the application technology is 
                                                 
82 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
83 See ERNEST CLINE, READY PLAYER ONE 58–60 (2011).  
84 See id. at 112. 
85 See Iron Gate Sec., Inc. v. Lowe’s Cos., No. 15-cv-8814(KBF), 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 101796, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2016) (finding the claims 
patent eligible because they were “directed to particular improvements 
over prior art multimedia data indexing techniques that render such data 
accessible in real time.”); see also Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. 
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding the 
patent claims at issue patent eligible because they were “not claiming the 
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routine and conventional is a question of fact,86 and the novel 
Ready Player One is not entirely clear on whether some 
improvement to the technology was required to make 
Flicksyncs possible.   
It is important to note that the technology probably 
need not be entirely novel or non-obvious in order to avoid 
being routine and conventional. 87  In other words, the 
eligibility hurdle of not routine and conventional seems to be 
potentially lower than the patentability hurdle of novelty and 
nonobviousness.88  
Consider a claim to an inventive abstract idea, where 
the non-abstract portion of the claim is more than routine 
and conventional, but less than new and non-obvious.  In 
other words, the non-abstract portion of the claim could be a 
sufficient “inventive concept” to pass § 101, but in order to 
pass §§ 102 and 103, it would need the help of the abstract 
(but more inventive) portion of the claim.  Such a claim would 
raise the question of whether ineligible subject matter should 
be filtered out of the §§ 102 and 103 analysis, that is, treated 
as prior art for purposes of that analysis even if new and non-
obvious, as has been persuasively argued.89  However, the 
                                                 
idea of filtering content simply applied to the Internet,” but were “instead 
claiming a technology-based solution . . . to filter content on the Internet 
that overcomes existing problems . . . .”). 
86  See Gugliuzza, supra note 37, manuscript 7 n.38; see also Aatrix 
Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1130 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018). 
87 See Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., 725 Fed. Appx. 959, 965 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (“Something is not well-understood, routine, and conventional 
merely because it is disclosed in a prior art reference.”). 
88 But see PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL 
GUIDE 14-30 – 14-31 (3d. ed. 2016) (“[T]he inventiveness required for § 
101 eligibility is distinct from and arguably more demanding than § 103 
nonobviousness analysis.”) (emphasis added). 
89  See Nicholas J. Szabo, Comment, Elemental Subject Matter, 7 
(unpublished Comment), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=936326 (“For § 101 subject matter analysis to be 
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prevailing approach instead seems to be to try to filter the 
ineligible matter out of the (comparatively) shorthand 
inventiveness inquiry at the § 101 stage, but not to do so in 
the full-blown § 103 obviousness analysis.90  As such, it seems 
that the inventiveness of an abstract idea can help to 
establish § 103 nonobviousness, even though it cannot help 
establish § 101 eligibility.    
 Although at some point virtual reality technology will 
likely become routine and conventional,91 the cases seem to 
suggest that we are not there yet.  Practically, framing the 
application of an abstract idea in virtual reality as a specific 
improvement to the virtual reality apparatus itself, if 
possible, can increase the likelihood of a finding of patent 
eligibility. 92   For example, in Thales, the Federal Circuit 
                                                 
coherent, it must serve not as a bar but as a filter, a preliminary step that 
alters element by element how the claims will be analyzed by § 102 and 
§ 103.”). See also Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (en banc) (Reyna, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for 
rehearing en banc) (noting that the “Supreme Court has characterized 
the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry as a threshold test that precedes the 
requirements described in §§ 102, 103, and 112.”). 
90  MENELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 14-31 (“According to Mayo, the 
inventive application requirement treats the patentees’ discovery of the 
law of nature, physical phenomena, abstract ideas, or algorithms (in 
Flook) as known (even where it was not), whereas § 103 nonobviousness 
focuses on ‘the differences between the claimed invention and the prior 
art.’”); see also Rogers, supra note 77 (explaining that the § 101 analysis 
“need not be the same thing as conducting an in-depth novelty or 
obviousness analysis in which the claimed invention is rigorously 
compared to the prior art.”). 
91  See LEXINNOVA, VIRTUAL REALITY: PATENT LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS 4 
(2015), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/plrdocs/en/lexinnova_plr_virtual_reali 
ty.pdf (“Virtual Reality is expected to be a far-reaching technology in the 
next 10 years.”). 
92 See Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) (explaining that courts evaluating eligibility must “ask 
whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer 
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found that the claims at issue were “not directed to an 
abstract idea” because they “specif[ied] a particular 
configuration of inertial sensors and a particular method of 
using the raw data from the sensors in order to more 
accurately calculate the position and orientation of an object 
on a moving platform.”93   
Following Thales, the district court in Electronic 
Scripting Products found the claims patent eligible because 
they were “not merely directed to the abstract idea of 
observing known points in space and determining their 
position and orientation,” but rather, were directed to the use 
of “photodetectors and relative motion sensors mounted on 
manipulated objects to provide a low-cost method to 
determine absolute pose in close-range and confined three-
dimensional environments, ideal for virtual reality 
applications.”94  Thus, it seems that by claiming for example 
a particular configuration or use of physical sensors to 
implement an abstract idea in virtual reality, a patentee can 
avoid pre-empting too much future innovation and increase 
the chances that the claims will be upheld as patent 
eligible.95  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea”) (quoting Enfish, 
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
93 Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2017); see also Chargepoint, Inc. v. Semaconnect, Inc., No. MJG-17-3717 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49026, *29 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2018) (stating that in 
Thales, “the Federal Circuit held that the claims were directed to an 
improvement in technology instead of an abstract idea”). 
94 Elec. Scripting Prods. v. HTC Am. Inc., No. 17-cv-05806-RS 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 43687, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2018). 
95 See id. at *13 (“Nor do the asserted Patents disproportionately preempt 
the use of all virtual reality products.”). 
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III. ARTIFICIAL THOUGHTS 
 
As the preceding discussion has shown by way of example, 
the law is not always a model of clarity and coherence.  But 
it is worth considering whether such occasional inefficiencies 
may just be part of the price we pay for governing ourselves.96 
Allegedly the “rise of Big Data could fundamentally change 
the design and structure of legal norms and thus the legal 
system itself.” 97  Indeed, with the rise of self-driving 
vehicles, 98  Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett have 
predicted “that laws, too, will be self-driving.”99  In the same 
vein, these same authors predict that advances in artificial 
intelligence and communications technology will “be able to 
identify the rules applicable to an actual situation and inform 
the regulated actor exactly how to comply” and that such 
“microdirectives will become the dominant form of law[.]”100  
Accordingly they predict that “opportunities for statutory 
interpretation and filling the gaps in vague standards will 
dry up as citizens are simply instructed to obey simple 
directives.”101   
                                                 
96  See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[T]o 
institute a new Government, laying its foundations on such principles as 
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness[.]”). 
97 Christoph Busch & Alberto De Franceschi, Granular Legal Norms: Big 
Data and the Personalization of Private Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
DATA SCIENCE AND LAW (forthcoming 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3181914. 
98 See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in 
Arizona, Where Robots Roam, THE N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018).  
99  Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. 
TORONTO L. J. 429, 442 (2016).  
100  Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and 
Standards, 92 IND. L. J. 1401, 1404 (2017). 
101 Id. at 1435 (emphasis added). Casey and Niblett note that one might 
alternatively frame this trend towards “a simple microdirective for how 
to comply with the law,” as “the death of standards.”  Id. at 1405.  It is 
worth observing that the recent trend at least in patent law seems to have 
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 Casey and Niblett explicitly decline to take a 
normative position on whether this alleged trend, which they 
say implies a reduced role for judges, is beneficial for 
society,102 though they do seem to contend that it will happen 
regardless.103 This sort of tech-determinism is not uncommon 
in the realm of technology generally, 104  but it seems 
particularly inappropriate as applied to law.105  The fact that 
                                                 
been in precisely the opposite direction.  See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Supreme 
Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (2016) (“[T]he 
Court has consistently adopted holistic standards to replace the bright-
line, formalistic rules that are characteristic of Federal Circuit patent 
doctrine”). 
102 Casey & Niblett, supra note 100, at 1405 (“Our analysis is positive 
rather than normative.  One might think of perfect calibration of laws to 
legislative goals as problematic in a system with multiple branches and 
checks and balances.  Indeed, our analysis implies a reduced role for 
judges and perhaps the need for institutional reforms to preserve 
important aspects of our current system.”).  It is interesting that the 
authors explicitly decline to make a normative case for the sweeping 
changes they seem to herald. 
103 See id. at 1445 (“One might think that if the institutional upheaval 
and autonomy concerns are great enough, lawmakers will reject the move 
to microdirectives.  We do not see this happening.  The growth of 
predictive technology is robust.”); id. at 1402 (“This new form – we call it 
the microdirective – is the future of law.”); Casey & Niblett, supra note 
99, at 438 (“The trend towards micro-directives will be real as the cost of 
prediction and communication falls.  The consequences relating to 
morality, privacy, and autonomy should be addressed before micro-
directives arrive.”). 
104 See, e.g., ROB RIEMEN, TO FIGHT AGAINST THIS AGE 129 (2018) (“[H]e 
added threateningly that ‘we simply have to adjust to the fact that this is 
the future, these are the coming technological developments, you can’t 
stop them, no one can.’”). 
105 Cf. John Gardner, The Twilight of Legality 16 (University of Oxford, 
Working Paper No. 4/2018) available at https://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3109517 (“Tech-determinism is today the 
favoured way of making those who still believe in the rule of law look like 
they are going to be on the wrong side of history.  Uber, for example, has 
notoriously favoured that line: the rule of law is so yesterday; Uber is the 
unstoppable future.”). 
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we may have acquired the technology to change the law in a 
certain way does not by itself provide adequate justification 
for doing so; the normative case must be made.106 
 What could possibly go wrong? One concern recognized 
in this literature is that personalized automated law 
“abandons the equal application of general standards to all 
individuals,” and perhaps one of the advantages of more 
general laws is that they “deliberately ignore personal details 
and thus grant a ‘protective space’ of individual freedom 
where the law does not enter.”107  Similarly, autonomy “may 
be increasingly constrained as more and more ethical 
decisions are shifted from the purview of flawed humans to 
consistent machines,” 108  and “[citizens who simply] follow 
rules and directives may become robotic, mere automatons 
who fail to appreciate the moral choices that should underlie 
their actions.”109   
This concern also seems to suggest some tension 
between, on the one hand, the push towards micro-managing 
people through legal micro-directives, and on the other hand, 
the notion that the liberal democratic state should be a 
limited state.110  If the laws governing daily life in a society 
                                                 
106  See supra note 102. Despite explicitly disclaiming the normative, 
Casey and Niblett do contend that the “micro-directive” “[capture] the 
benefits of both rules and standards without incurring the costs.”).  Casey 
& Niblett, supra note 100, at 1402.  See also id. at 1402 n.1 (citing Louis 
Kapalow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 
557, 561 n.6 (1992)).  There is at least one persuasive alternative account 
of the rules and standards dialectic that Casey and Niblett do not 
address. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV., 379 
(1985) (discussing an alternative account of the rules and standards 
dialectic that Casey and Niblett do not address). 
107 Busch & De Franceschi, supra note 97, at *15–16. 
108 Casey & Niblett, supra note 99, at 438. 
109 Casey & Niblett, supra note 100, at 1444. 
110  Pierre Schlag, Hohfeldian Analysis, Liberalism and Adjudication 
(Some Tensions), THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR 
WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARY, 
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become so complex that ordinary citizens would need an 
artificially intelligent robot directing them as to how to be in 
compliance, 111  perhaps the better solution might be to 
simplify the laws—to make them more understandable and 
bring them more into accord with intuition. 112   As for 
constitutional objections, Casey and Niblett proclaim that 
“courts could, of course, bless the use of particular types of 
algorithms going forward, deeming those to be 
constitutionally proper,” and that such “delegation would 
facilitate the promulgation of micro-directives in the 
constitutional law space.”113    
There is at least one additional concern that does not 
seem to be fully recognized in this literature: the effect that 
legal automation could have upon legal thought.  Artificial 
intelligence can tend to reduce thought when we let machines 
do our thinking for us.114  For example, when one uses GPS 
automatic driving navigation systems, part of the mind shuts 
off and one does not tend to learn their way around the roads 
                                                 
(Balganesh, Sichelman, Smith eds. 2018) (manuscript at 22) (forthcoming 
2018) (“From a Hohfeldian perspective, the assertion that a privilege is a 
law-free zone is an analytical error.  But from the strictly political 
perspective of liberalism, it is not an error at all.  On the contrary, the 
spatialization strategy is wrought up with the fundamental political 
liberal project of protecting the freedom of the sovereign individual legal 
subject.”). 
111 Casey & Niblett, supra note 100, at 1401 (“When an individual citizen 
faces a legal choice, the machine will select from the catalog and 
communicate to that individual the precise context-specific command (the 
microdirective) necessary for compliance.”). 
112  See R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2006) (“[I]ntuition is 
invariably central—whether overtly so or not—to the process of arriving 
at a judicial outcome by any standard recognized means.”). 
113 Casey & Niblett, supra note 100, at 1436. 
114 See, e.g., Jeremy Bernstein, Out of My Mind: “A.I.”, 49 AM. SCHOLAR, 
295, 299 (1980); Cf. FOER, supra note 10, at 72 (“The problem is that when 
we outsource thinking to machines, we are really outsourcing thinking to 
the organizations that run the machines.”). 
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as well.115  Now this may not be a huge problem by itself, but 
it does potentially raise a red flag about automating other 
things, such as the law. Despite the modern (arguably 
detrimental) reverence for positive thinking,116 it seems that 
relatively little attention is paid to the value of thought itself. 
It was observed some time ago that one of the 
drawbacks of computerized law is that it would render law 
uninteresting.117  This is not meant in the sense that the law 
would become boring, but rather that people would no longer 
have much of an incentive to be interested in it.  Judges and 
lawyers have a strong incentive to think about the law118 and 
currently spend lots of time and energy doing just that,119 as 
the analysis of patentable subject matter above shows by way 
of example.  But judges and lawyers are predicted to have a 
reduced role in the future of automated law,120 and of course, 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., Joseph Stromberg, Is GPS ruining our ability to navigate for 
ourselves?, VOX (Sept. 2, 2015, 11:31 AM), available at https:// 
www.vox.com/2015/9/2/9242049/gps-maps-navigation (“we have good 
reason to believe that when we blindly follow GPS for direction, we’re not 
exercising crucial navigational skills – and many of the scientists who 
study how the human brain navigates are concerned”). 
116 See BARBARA EHRENREICH, BRIGHT-SIDED: HOW POSITIVE THINKING IS 
UNDERMINING AMERICA (2009). See also Albert J. Matricciani, Law & The 
Culture of Civility, 36 MD. B. J. 12, 14 (2003) (discussing the value of 
thought and the loss of personal space that has come with 21st century 
technology.). 
117 See Anthony D’Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges, 11 GA. 
L. REV. 1277, 1299 (1977) (“A second cost will be to render areas of the 
law uninteresting.”). 
118  Cf. Pasquale, supra note 25, at manuscript 56 (explaining that 
articulable legal standards “help us formulate convincing explanations 
and justifications of legal decisionmaking, without foreordaining 
outcomes in advance.”). 
119 See D’Amato, supra note 117, at 1299 (“At present, many people are 
immediately interested, whether financially or from a teaching or 
research point of view, in conflicts of laws.”). 
120 Id. at 1301. 
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if there are fewer judges and lawyers, then there would also 
be fewer law students, and fewer law professors.   
In such a future, who would pay attention to whether 
the law is fair or makes sense?  Our current system, where 
the law is shaped through a collaborative process involving 
judges, lawyers, and to some extent clients, may not always 
provide the clearest law most efficiently, but it does have the 
advantage of ensuring that a class of people are paying close 
attention to the law, and thus provides a certain degree of 
accountability. 121   The legal thought and effort of many 
people could be called redundant, (as compared with law in 
the hands of a machine), but redundancy is not always a bad 
thing.122  The human collaborative process through which the 
law is applied (and to some extent made) is an important 
aspect of the rule of law.123   
Law in a sense is something that we as a society “do,” 
so if we let machines do it for us, we might lose something 
important, even if the machines do it well.124  An excellent 
argument can move a judge and incrementally change the 
law.  This circumstance might be rare but the possibility 
                                                 
121 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 
(1921) (“[T]he judgment of the lawyer class, will spread to others, and 
tinge the common consciousness and the common faith.”). 
122 See generally John Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 
TEX. L. REV. 629 (2016). 
123 Richard H. Fallon, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19 (1997) (“[T]heories approaching the 
Legal Process ideal type tend to conceive the subjects of legal justice as 
reasonable persons, open to argument and persuasion, and deserving of 
reasoned explanations that the law should aspire to provide.”); Pasquale, 
supra note 25, at manuscript 49 (explaining that where legal technology 
“reduces a legal relationship to a clear prescription . . . it is unlikely to 
meet the complex standards of review and appeal embodied in the Legal 
Process conception of the rule of law.”). 
124 See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 140 (1998) (“To 
put it plainly: To be really good at ‘doing law,’ one has to have serious 
blind spots and a stunningly selective sense of curiosity.”). 
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encourages citizens to think about and question our laws, 
instead of blindly submitting to them. 125   The process by 
which society can influence the law (through lawyers and 
judges as intermediaries) may give us some sense that the 
law is our collective creation instead of an opaque governing 
authority.126  
When law is instantaneously determined and 
communicated such that actors need only “obey,” 127  the 
period of suspended conclusion, during which thought takes 
place,128 is lost.  Can we trust machines to make and explain 
the value judgments inherent in legal analysis?129  Are we 
                                                 
125 Cf. Matthew Redna, Kennedy Defends Rule of Law, Europe in Ninth 
Circuit Speech, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 26, 2018), https:// 
www.courthousenews.com/kennedy-defends-rule-of-law-europe-in-ninth-
circuit-speech/ (quoting Justice Kennedy as saying, “For us [the law is] a 
promise. It’s a promise of liberty, of freedom, it means the right to plan 
our own destiny.”). 
126  See Pasquale, supra note 25, at manuscript 6 (“In order for legal 
automation to truly respect rule of law principles, the adage ‘a rule of law, 
not of men’ thus must be complemented by a new commitment – to a ‘rule 
of persons, not machines.’”). 
127 Compare Casey & Niblett, supra note 100, at 1402 (“The citizen does 
not have to weigh the reasonableness of her actions, nor does she have to 
search for the content of a law.  She just obeys a simple directive.”); with 
Learned Hand, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, 33 N.Y. ST. B. J. 415, 415 (1944) 
(“Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no 
constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court 
can even do much to help it.”). 
128 See JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 12 (1933) (explaining that reflective 
thinking “involves (1) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental 
difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching, 
hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and 
dispose of the perplexity.”); see also Donald J. Kochan, Thinking Like 
Thinkers: Is the Art and Discipline of an ‘Attitude of Suspended 
Conclusion’ Lost on Lawyers?, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 n.5 (2011). 
129  See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in 
Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1, 68 (2016) (“Inherent in the very idea of 
judging is the notion of judgment; courts are frequently delegated 
regulatory and adjudicative tasks that must choose between valid and 
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comfortable with the idea of a future where, instead of 
providing a legal opinion supported by reasons and developed 
after considering arguments advanced through an 
adversarial process, a “black box” machine simply spits out a 
legal directive,130 and the obedient citizen complies?  This 
system would amount to a pure assertion of authority, as 
opposed to the giving of reasons in a judicial opinion after an 
opportunity to be heard, which at least serves as an 
explanation. 131  But when the only legal rule that people 
know or understand is to follow the “micro-directive”—“obey 
the machine”—then so much for transparency, candor, and 
perhaps even rule of law.132   
                                                 
important social values.”); Joshua P. Davis, Law Without Mind: AI, 
Ethics, and Jurisprudence 1 (Univ. of S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2018-
05, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3187513 
(arguing that the “ultimate bulwark against ceding legal interpretation 
to computers – from having computers usurp the responsibility and 
authority of attorneys, citizens, and even judges – may be to recognize the 
role of moral judgment in saying what the law is.”).  
130 Davis, supra note 129, at 12 (“AI is often not transparent.”).  For the 
sake of transparency, were we to allow some AI to make its way into our 
law, it is important that the underlying code at least be made public and 
not be kept as a trade secret. Cf. David S. Levine, Secrecy and 
Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 135 (2007) (arguing that trade secrets should to transparency and 
accountability in public infrastructure). 
131  Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636–37 
(1995) (“The act of giving a reason is the antithesis of authority.  When 
the voice of authority fails, the voice of reason emerges. Or vice versa.”) 
(emphasis added). 
132  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND 
MORALITY 213 (1979) (“It is one of the important principles of the [rule of 
law] doctrine that the making of particular laws should be guided by open 
and relatively stable general rules.”); cf. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 195 
(Harv. Univ. Press 2011) (“the exercise of legal authority . . . is an activity 
of social planning”); Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 987, 990–91 (2008) (“[J]udges must make public the legal grounds 
for their decisions. Those who fail to give sincere legal justifications 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In Ready Player One, the eccentric genius creator of the 
OASIS was interested in 1980s culture and created a contest 
for control of his company in part to give the world an 
incentive to share his obsession, a strategy which worked to 
considerable effect.133  Judges, lawyers, law students, and 
law professors, are to some degree obsessed with the law (or 
at least quite interested in it), because they have an incentive 
to be, as the above discussion of abstract ideas and patent 
eligible subject matter shows by way of example.    
The more the law is automated, the less we as a society 
will pay attention to and think about the law.  This result 
might not seem like a problem if the artificial intelligence of 
the law is entirely just and well made.  But let’s assume, 
arguendo, that it is, and that automated law initially works 
just fine—or even better than fine; more efficient and more 
consistent than when law was in the hands of humans.  
Citizens become accustomed to a world in which they simply 
obey the law machine.  No one is thinking about the law 
because the machines do our legal thinking for us.   
Is this potential loss of legal thought a problem?  
Perhaps not initially, but it could become a very serious 
problem if some untrustworthy group of people were to gain 
control of the law machine, and start changing its commands 
for their own benefit, rather than for the benefit of society.134  
                                                 
violate this condition of legitimacy.”); Emily Berman, A Government of 
Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
133 See CLINE, supra note 13, at 50. 
134 Cf. TOYAMA, supra note 1, at 29 (“Like a lever, technology amplifies 
people’s capacities in the direction of their intentions.”).  Potentially, one 
way to at least partially guard against this sort of usurpation could be 
through the use of decentralized blockchain technology. Cf. Michael 
Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 368 (2016) 
(“Part I of this article will introduce the concept of peer-to-peer 
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It might be difficult to imagine that corrupt people could rise 
to power, but the possibility cannot be discounted.  And if it 
did happen, with the world engrossed in a virtual reality 
oasis, simply obeying the law machine in the real world, then 
who would notice, and when?     
                                                 
governance by identifying its three critical components: (1) a 
decentralized ledger; (2) a decentralized decision; and (3) a decentralized 
fisc.”). 
